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Abstract 
 
This longitudinal study explores the influence of leaders on performance in the iconic, high-
technology, turbulent industry of Formula One.  The evidence is evaluated through the emerging 
theory of expert leadership which proposes the existence of a first-order requirement: it is that 
leaders should have expert knowledge in the core-business of the organizations they are to lead 
(holding constant management and leadership experience).  The study’s findings provide strong 
support for the ‘expert leader’ hypothesis. The most successful F1 principals are 
disproportionately those who started their careers as drivers.  Moreover, within the sub-sample of 
former drivers, it is those who had the longest driving careers who went on to become the most 
effective leaders.  Remarkably, the leader’s former experience in competitive racing is a better 
predictor of current organizational performance than the driving experience of the person who is 
actually racing for the team.  The study’s expert-leader findings are consistent with the 
hypothesis that longitudinal performance improves when a leader’s knowledge and expertise 
correlate with an organization’s core-business activity. 
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Introduction 
The success or failure of organizations naturally depends on many factors (e.g. resources, 
path-dependence, human resource capability, economic climate, the executive, and so on).  
CEOs are usually the most highly paid employees which, arguably, reflects the expectations that 
executive boards, shareholders and the media place on institutional heads.  There is a growing 
research literature that attempts to isolate the influence that leaders have on performance.  Such 
work attempts to separate CEO effects from industry or firm effects to calculate the explanatory 
power of leaders on the variance in firm profitability (e.g. Lieberson & O’Connor, 1972; Thomas 
1988; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996; Bertrand & Schoar, 2003; Jones & Olken 2005; 
Bennedsen, Perez-Gonzalez & Wolfenzon 2007; Yukl, 2008; Mackey, 2008; Dezsö & Ross, 
2012; Nohe, Michaelis, Menges, Zhang, & Sonntag, 2013; Lazear, Shaw & Stanton, 2013; 
Hambrick & Quigley, 2014).  In this research, the leader effect varies widely from 4% (Thomas, 
1988) to 15% (Wasserman, Nohria & Anand, 2010) up to 30% (Mackey, 2008), and recently 
closer to 40% (Hambrick & Quigley, 2014).  This disparity reflects the challenges that 
researchers face in trying to separate leader effects from fixed effects in real-world settings 
(Antonakis, Bendahan, Jacquart, & Lalive, 2010; Blettner, Chaddad and Bettis, 2012).    
Our study contributes to this literature.  However, we simplify both the measurable inputs 
and outputs:  we focus on a single leader characteristic that we suggest is of fundamental 
importance, and we are able to include performance data that are unambiguous.  We examine 
leadership and performance using data on the entire history of the turbulent high-technology 
industry of Formula One (hereafter F1).  The evidence is evaluated through the emerging theory 
of expert leadership (such as Goodall, 2009a, 2012) which proposes that there exists a first-order 
requirement: it is that leaders should have expert knowledge in the core-business of the 
organizations they are to lead (holding constant the background level of management and 
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leadership experience).   The supporting evidence, outlined below, suggests that leader 
characteristics that most closely align with the core-business activity of the organization are 
associated, over time, with better performance.   
The study is concerned with theory-testing and, in part, theory-building.  Its aims are 
twofold. The first is to make a novel contribution to the leadership literature by taking a small 
step in the process of developing a theory of expert leadership.  Second, we test further the 
expert-leader hypothesis in a new setting, one that enables us in an unusually sharp way to 
examine the effect of different kinds of leaders on key followers.  In the next section of the paper 
we review the extant expert-leader literature. In Section 3 we interpret the empirical patterns 
through the nascent theoretical lens of expert leadership.  The paper’s hypotheses, which lead to 
a new test of expert leaders, are presented at the end of this section.  The empirical work begins 
in Section 4, with a detailed description of our F1 data.  This is followed by the econometric 
analysis and regression results in Section 5.  In the penultimate part of the paper, we discuss how 
our empirical findings extend the theoretical claims, and we conclude in Section 7.  
  2. Antecedent ‘expert leader’ research 
The approach of this study is to identify the key leader-characteristics that are associated with 
organizational success.  The conceptual idea of expert leaders arose from earlier studies that 
identified a link between the core-business knowledge (termed expert knowledge) held by a 
leader and organizational performance.  Core-business is interpreted as the primary or underlying 
activity, namely, that which is considered to be the most important or central endeavor in an 
organization -- its main source of success and profits.   
In this section we will summarize the evidence from which ideas of expert leaders have 
arisen.   
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The expert-leader claims are based on evidence from research in a number of settings.   The 
first of these studies analyzed the characteristics of university presidents and institutional 
performance.  Two findings were documented: first, a highly significant cross-section correlation 
was found between the position of universities in a global league table, and the research success 
of university presidents (Goodall, 2006)
1
.  The higher up the institution was in the ranking, the 
higher were the research citations of the president.  This simple pattern motivated a second, more 
in-depth, investigation.  In a longitudinal dataset comprising 157 university presidents, a panel of 
55 research universities, and 9 years of performance data, a second pattern was identified.  It 
showed that university performance was linked, a number of years later, to the current 
president’s own scholarly success.  The regression equations, which adjusted for confounding 
variables, revealed that 16% of the variance in university performance could be explained by a 
president’s lifetime citations (Goodall, 2009a,b). The institutions in the sample were research 
universities.  Their core-business is doing research and teaching, though promotion of faculty 
rests primarily on the former.    
New research has moved inside universities.  It uses longitudinal evidence on departmental 
chairpersons in 58 US institutions over a 15-year period (Goodall, McDowell & Singell, 2013). 
The study finds that there is one robust predictor of a department’s future performance: after 
adjusting for a range of personal and institutional characteristics, departmental productivity 
improves when the incoming department Chair’s publications are highly cited.  Approximately 
7.5% of the variance is explained by the Chair’s citations.  By contrast, the quality-weighted 
publication record per se of the incoming Chair has no predictive power.   
                                                          
1
 The same statistical correlation was found in the FT MBA Ranking between the position of business schools and 
their deans (Goodall, 2009a). 
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In a different environment, the high-skill setting of US basketball, the impact of coaches on 
team performance in the National Basketball Association (NBA) between 1996 and 2003 has 
been examined (Goodall, Kahn and Oswald, 2011).  Data on 219 coach-year observations on 68 
coaches were used to compute winning percentages and post-season playoffs.  The paper 
documented the fact that brilliance as a player is associated with (much later) winning percentage 
and playoff success of that person as a team coach.  The results revealed that leaders’ effects on 
performance are substantial and are visible in the data within the first 12 months of a new coach 
being hired.   
Evidence has also been published in a cross-sectional study using US hospital data; it showed 
that hospitals ranked higher (in the ‘US News and World Report, Best Hospitals ranking’) were 
more likely to be led by a clinician (MD) than a professional manager (Goodall, 2011).  This 
finding supports earlier work in hospitals suggesting that the separation of clinical and 
managerial knowledge is associated with worse management (Bloom, Propper, Seiler & Van 
Reenen, 2010).  Bloom and colleagues concluded that the proportion of managers with a clinical 
degree had a positive and significant effect on hospital performance.  In a related study, 
Veronesi, Kirkpatrick and Vallascas (2013) found that the number of clinicians on a hospital 
board was associated with better hospital performance. 
Finally, in new research with a slightly different focus, one that analyzes leader competence 
and worker well-being, there is evidence that a boss’s technical competence is the single 
strongest predictor of workers’ well-being (Artz, Goodall & Oswald, 2014).  In a cross-section of 
6000 young U.S. workers, the job satisfaction of employees is positively associated with whether 
the supervisor worked his or her way up within the company (or started the company).  Second, 
in a cross-section of 1600 British workers, satisfaction levels are higher among individuals 
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whose supervisor could if necessary step in competently to do that job.  Finally, in pooled cross-
sections totaling 27,000 individuals, workers’ job satisfaction is highly correlated with the 
competence of supervisors (Artz, et al., 2014)
 2
.   These results support the claim that both 
competence – linked to expert knowledge – and industry experience improve workers’ job 
satisfaction.  There is evidence that happier workers also make more productive workers 
(Edmans, 2012). 
3. Expert leadership theory and hypotheses 
3.1 Emergent theory of expert leadership 
In this section we attempt to develop theory that starts to explain the empirical patterns, 
described above, and make generalizable predictions about leadership in diverse settings (Sutton 
& Staw, 1995).  We suggest a theory of expert leadership to predict that performance is 
improved when the expert knowledge of a leader is aligned with the core-business of the 
organization.  This, we suggest, can be viewed as a first-order requirement: knowledge of the 
core business of the organization is of major importance, holding constant a leader’s 
management and leadership experience.  Put simply, the suggestion is that hiring panels should 
look substantially at the expert knowledge/core-business relationship.  Once this is established, 
other important factors can be scrutinized as a secondary process.  For example, two individuals 
may be identified as potential heads because they fit the first-order requirement of being experts 
in the organization’s core business.  However, both of these experts might differ hugely in the 
more subjective attributes, for example, their style of leadership (transactional/transformational), 
or their personality (charisma/traits), and also in the nature of their relationships (leader–member 
exchange).  These secondary factors are likely to exhibit greater disparities.  It is important to 
                                                          
2
 This body of work includes a further example from UK soccer not summarized for reasons of brevity.  
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note that expert knowledge is not viewed as a proxy for management skills or leadership 
experience; these factors are required by all senior executives.   
Attention to leaders’ core-business knowledge is apposite.  Recent evidence shows that major 
firms have moved away from hiring CEOs who might be considered specialists (with technical 
degrees), towards instead the selection of leaders who are generalist managers (Frydman, 2007; 
Bertrand, 2009).  Professional managers have replaced experts in leadership positions in a 
number of industries, of which healthcare is an appropriate example.   Hospitals in the US and 
UK used to be led by doctors.  Today, in US hospitals approximately 4% of CEOs are medically 
trained (MDs) (Gunderman & Kanter, 2009), and there are even fewer in the UK.  The evidence 
from hospital studies outlined above suggests that the pendulum may have swung too far towards 
managers (Bloom, Propper, Seiler & Van Reenen, 2010; Goodall, 2011; Veronesi, Kirkpatrick & 
Vallascas, 2013).    
Expert knowledge, we propose, incorporates two elements: ability in the core-business 
activity (i.e. success in scholarship if in a university, or consulting success if in a consulting 
firm), combined with industry experience (i.e. number of years spent in a sector).  We submit 
that expert knowledge is acquired through technical education, and a combination of domain-
specific knowledge and experience (Chase & Simon, 1973; de Groot, 1978).  These forms of 
explicit and tacit knowledge (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995) may facilitate leaders’ intuitive 
decision-making, akin to wisdom (Tichy & Bennis, 2007).   Performance might therefore be 
attained through mechanisms of expert decision making, derived from domain-knowledge, 
experience and practice (Ericsson, Krampe, & Tesch-Romer, 1993; Salas & Klein, 2001; Salas, 
Rosen & DiazGranados, 2010).  The literature on which the expert-leader proposition rests 
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(presented earlier), suggests that level of ability in the core business activity is important; it is not 
merely experience and technical qualifications that matter
3
.   
Does expert knowledge constitute a trait?  Zaccaro, Kemp & Bader (2004) suggest that 
leader traits should, among other factors, be considered as ‘integrated constellations of attributes 
that influence leadership performance’ (Zaccaro, 2007. p. 108).  ‘Understanding leadership’, 
Zaccaro argues, ‘requires a focus not only on multiple personal attributes but also on how these 
attributes work together to influence performance’ (in Zaccaro, 2007. p. 108 citing Yukl & Van 
Fleet, 1992; Zaccaro et al., 2004).  It is difficult to disagree with this logic; however, to 
unscramble and assess leader inputs and performance outcomes, from an interaction of multiple 
complex variables, may be particularly problematic.   Instead, we attempt to narrow the field of 
observation, and introduce a sequence of priority.  Thus far the empirical evidence suggests that 
the expert knowledge variable explains on average fifteen per cent of performance.  Arguably, 
traits play a key role in expert knowledge, through motivation and ability (Bray, Campbell, and 
Grant, 1974) among other attributes. This warrants further investigation in future research
4
.   
The suggestion that leaders and followers should share technical expertise in creative work 
environments has been known for some time.  In a study of research institutes, Andrews and 
Farris (1967) found that the best predictor of a researcher’s creative performance was the 
leader’s level of technical ability as compared with other factors including motivating others, 
maintaining group relationships, and the amount of autonomy granted to staff.  These results 
were replicated by Barnowe (1975) and later in other studies summarized in Mumford, Scott, 
Gaddis, and Strange (2002).   Mumford et al. (2002) report, first, that both technical and creative 
                                                          
3
 For example, in universities it is possible for an academic to drop out of research early in his or her career to 
become a full-time administrator.  However, as mentioned above, these kinds of leaders were shown not to be 
beneficial to the performance of research universities; instead, the evidence suggests that the better the scholar as 
president, the better the future research performance of the university (Goodall, 2009a,b). 
4
 We would like to thank an anonymous referee for bringing to our attention the relevance of the trait literature.   
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problem-solving skills are necessary when leading creative individuals; this combination informs 
how leaders create an appropriate work structure, and gives them credibility which enhances a 
leader’s influence (2002, p. 712).   Second, they argue that the evaluation of creative people and 
their ideas is best done by individuals who share their competencies.  Third, leaders who share 
the same creative and technical perspective and motivation as their followers can, they suggest, 
communicate more clearly; finally, in relation to performance, they can better articulate the 
needs and goals of the organization (Mumford et al., 2002).    
The modest but growing body of research advancing the expert leader assertion directly 
builds on these studies.  However, our F1 study differs empirically and theoretically in distinct 
ways.  First, and, importantly, the data are from a high-technology competitive setting that is 
very different to the creativity or research environments summarized in Mumford et al. (2002); 
second, we use empirical tests that differ substantially from those summarized by the authors.  
These earlier papers report cross-section correlations from a single point in time (the only 
exception is Farris 1969 who had two points in time
5
).  Our paper uses longitudinal data; it is a 
case study that contains information from the whole history of the F1 industry, and we link 
leader-characteristics to more objectively measured performance outcomes.  Third, we include a 
unique interaction analysis where it is possible to examine the effect of different leader-types on 
the performance of key followers.    
Lastly, our F1 study diverges from Mumford et al. (2002) in its theoretical claims.  Although 
still embryonic, it is intended that the expert leader proposition be advanced as a generalizable 
leadership theory -- one that may be applicable in different organizational situations, from within 
knowledge-intensive organizations, to manufacturing and retail, for example.  To build theory, 
                                                          
5
 A table outlining the studies reviewed in Mumford et al. (2002) is in Appendix 3. 
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arguably, an important part of the process is to establish its empirical boundaries, by performing 
tests in different settings.  Mumford and colleagues state clearly that they only ‘review the 
available literature examining leadership behaviors contributing to creativity and innovation’ 
(2002, p. 705); importantly, we do not believe that these authors were intending to establish a 
comprehensive or generalizable theory of leadership. 
Before concluding our theoretical discussion, it is important to briefly acknowledge the rich 
body of work motivated by upper echelons theory (Hambrick & Mason, 1984) that feeds into the 
ideas of expert leaders. The upper echelons literature shows, in its simplest form, that top 
managers make strategic choices that are reflections of their own values and cognitions, derived 
often from domain knowledge among other influences (see Carpenter, Geletkanycz, & Sanders, 
2004 for a review).  One possible difference in approach is that upper echelons theory has tended 
to place greatest emphasis on the characteristics of the top management team, whereas our work, 
including previous studies, isolates the leader himself or herself.    
 
3.2. Leader taxonomy  
F1 is made up of constructors (e.g. Ferrari, Williams, McLaren, etc.) who compete each 
season in Grand Prix races to win Championships.  Constructors are medium-sized companies 
that employ on average around 400 people.  Constructors need to raise an approximate annual 
amount of $200-$300 million dollars to compete in F1.  Leaders of constructor teams, called 
principals, operate in a skilled and stressful environment which requires quick decision-making.  
The role of the leader in F1 is to run the team.  Some differences exist in responsibilities between 
constructor teams; however, it is usual for the team leader to determine the long-term strategy, to 
control technical matters, and to make the majority of financial decisions.  Leaders also oversee 
the selection of drivers, who compete for their teams, and have a final say in making tactical 
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decisions during each race.  Some principals -- for example Frank Williams -- own and run their 
own teams.  Owner-leaders have extensive powers.  In other cases, principals are hired by 
owners to manage their teams.  Such is the relationship between the beverage company Red Bull 
and principal Christian Horner.  With large automobile manufacturers involved in racing, for 
example Mercedes, Renault and Ferrari, it is usual for a principal to be appointed, although their 
direct powers and responsibilities may vary across teams.   
In our F1 dataset (described below), it is possible to observe and classify every leader over 
the complete history of the industry, between 1950 and 2011.  The dataset also enables us to 
measure exact organizational performance.  We have objective data on the performance of each 
leader’s organization in each year allowing for minimal measurement error.  We also have, 
within the dataset, the ability to link organizational success today to the leader’s characteristics 
measured when those individuals were much younger.   
In this paper we argue that when the core-business activity of the firm aligns with the expert 
knowledge of the leader, it produces better organizational performance.  In F1, the core-business 
is to win the annual Championship by gaining points in Grand Prix races.  In our data, four 
distinct leader-types are found: those who were managers from other industries, former engineers 
(with degrees); those who were formerly mechanics; and, finally, former racing drivers. There 
was little ambiguity in leaders’ classification (discussed further below).  The leader taxonomy is 
as follows. 
Manager-leader: These were generalist leaders represented by former managers or 
entrepreneurs, who had significant knowledge about business in general, but knew very little 
about the core industries related to F1.  They typically spent most of their careers in business and 
moved to F1 from a different (and often unrelated) industry.  Manager-leaders tend not to have 
had much direct experience of the sector or racing driving, nor did they have technical education 
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in car making or mechanical engineering or a connected field.  They were also more likely to 
have become involved in the industry relatively late in their careers.  Manager-leaders, therefore, 
have the lowest level of expert knowledge. 
Engineer-leader: This group obtained degrees at university in mechanical engineering or a 
related field. They were technical specialists but had no experience of the core business activity 
(driving).  Former engineers tended to have less direct knowledge of how F1 teams function, 
because they were often a step back from the track.  Engineers never raced competitively and 
they often came into the field later than both mechanics and drivers.  Engineer-leaders, therefore, 
have a low level of expert knowledge. 
Mechanic-leader: Former mechanics have the most practical technical experience in car 
making and mechanical repair.  They tend not to have driven competitively, nor had they a 
degree in mechanical engineering or a related area.  However, mechanics often spent many years 
in the field of automobile racing and they worked very closely with drivers.  Mechanic-leaders, 
therefore, represent experienced leaders although they have no knowledge of the key activity of 
driving.   Former mechanics have a medium level of expert knowledge.  
Driver-Leader: Finally, former drivers usually start competitive racing from an early age 
(around 6-8 years old).  They then progress from Go-kart racing to professional racing by their 
early 20s.  Former drivers are experienced specialists; they need to be familiar with the technical 
side of car making, as well as with mechanical aspects of car improvement and repair.  Former 
mechanics have significant knowledge in the technical domain, some of which is shared with 
drivers.  In addition, drivers have racing expertise and are likely to have a greater understanding 
of strategy (i.e. they have experience on more than one dimension), because they work with all 
parts of F1 teams.  Drivers are usually the highest paid among team members.  Driver-leaders 
have an advanced level of expert knowledge.  
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3.3. Hypotheses  
In this paper we raise three hypotheses.  Hypothesis 1 encapsulates the paper’s key 
theoretical claim, laid out in Section 2, that F1 leaders who were former racing drivers are 
associated with greater team success.  The idea is represented diagrammatically in Figure 1.  
Team leaders who were formerly drivers -- when compared with team leaders who were 
formerly managers, engineers and mechanics -- have the highest level of expert knowledge, that 
we argue is a fundamental contributing factor correlated with later organizational performance.   
As depicted in Figure 1, the next-highest are the former mechanics, and then the graduate 
engineers and general managers.  Overall, the greater is a leader’s expert knowledge, the better is 
the performance of the F1 team. 
 
Hypothesis 1: F1 leaders who were former racing drivers have a high level of expert knowledge 
(long industry experience and high ability in the core-business activity) and thus 
former drivers are more strongly associated with later organizational 
performance than other leader types. [See Figure 1.]   
  
[INSERT Figure 1 HERE] 
 
 
Hypothesis 2 posits that the more years spent in competitive driving, the better the leader-
outcomes a number of years later.  This is represented in the matrix in Figure 2.  It shows that 
former drivers with more than five years racing experience are associated with the best 
performance outcomes as leaders.  
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Hypothesis 2: The more years that former racing drivers raced competitively, the better 
the results when they become team principal.   [See Figure 2.]  
 
Finally, a new empirical insight into expert leadership is advanced in hypothesis 3 and 
represented again in Figure 2.  It suggests that expert leaders – former drivers – have a 
direct influence on the performance of the key follower – the current driver.   Hypothesis 
3 proposes that the F1 racing experience of the current driver is less important to race 
performance than the racing experience of the team leader.   
 
Hypothesis 3: A former racing driver’s competitive experience matters more to 
leadership and team performance than the F1 racing experience of the 
current driver (the key follower).  [See Figure 2.] 
 
[INSERT Figure 2 HERE] 
 
4. Data and basic statistics  
 F1 is estimated to be worth approximately $6 billion annually (Sylt & Reid, 2011).  
Constructor teams’ profits come from advertising and TV revenue.   F1 is the most widely 
watched sport after the Olympics and Football’s World Cup, with over 500 million TV viewers 
in 2012
6
.  A higher finishing position, primarily a podium (first to third), generates more 
sponsorship and TV income.  Increasingly, modern teams are raising money from the 
development of F1 technologies that spill-over into other industries (McLaren have an associated 
company, Applied Technologies, as do Williams).  It is an interesting industry intellectually 
because it is subject to a great deal of regulatory turbulence.  The Fédération Internationale de 
                                                          
6
 Christian Sylt, theguardian.com, Friday 15 February 2013. 
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l’Automobile (FIA) imposes strict conditions that change annually, on all aspects of F1 (the 
teams, technology, resources, track, tires, drivers, etc.).  A link between regulation and 
innovation has been well documented (see Stewart 2010 for a review).  This relationship is 
embodied in F1; regulation is unambiguously associated with innovation and performance 
(Jenkins, 2004; Jenkins, Pasternak & West, 2007; Khanna, Kartik & Lane, 2003; Jenkins 2010, 
Marino, A., Aversa, P., Mesquita, L., & Anand, J. 2013), and regulatory compliance produces a 
level playing field for all competing teams.  Indeed, sometimes rule changes are made with the 
specific intention of curtailing the dominance of one team, for example with Ferrari and Michael 
Schumacher in 2003 (Hoisl, 2011).   
Teams’ common motivation means that relative comparison of teams’ performance can be 
more exact than in settings where different companies make different products: the setting offers 
an unusual opportunity to compare organizations in a precise way.  In addition, the core work-
teams in F1 are relatively small (average of 400), which arguably allows a natural and suitable 
background against which to begin to try to understand the influence of leaders.   
We collected data on: the starting and final position of all cars that participated in each race; 
the constructor teams; their leaders’ names, personal information and background; the drivers’ 
personal information and background; and information about each race circuit.  For a small 
number of years, information is also available on team budgets (2006 and 2008).  The data were 
compiled from two main sources.  For car entries, circuit, constructor, driver, as well as other 
detailed Grand Prix race information, we used the FORIX online database of Autosport 
magazine accessible on http://forix.autosport.com.  The names and background information on 
each team leader were taken from the Grand Prix Encyclopedia website 
http://www.grandprix.com.
7
 
                                                          
7
 In some cases, when more detailed information for any particular leader was required, we have double-checked 
biographical information with information recorded in official biographies of leaders who currently hold positions 
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4.1 F1 constructors 
  
The dataset covers the performance of every team in every Grand Prix season since the 
industry began.  This is for six decades of the F1 World Constructors’ Championship between 
1950 and 2011 (62 seasons) resulting in a total of 19,536 car entries in 858 races.  There are 106 
constructor teams in these historical data.  Constructors contract with numerous auto component 
suppliers because since 1981, they are obliged to build their own race car chassis, and often also 
engines (Castellucci & Ertug, 2010).   The goal of an F1 constructor is to maximize the number 
of points gained in races.  In recent years each team entered two cars in consecutive races every 
year.  Championship points are awarded based on the final position of each car at the end of the 
race (the first car wins the largest number of points, with other race points assigned, in a 
declining way, down to tenth position).  Constructor teams are comparable in size.  Identical 
criteria are applied to measure their performance.   
In contrast to many industries that greatly vary in size and output, F1 constructor teams are 
fairly homogeneous in their size, capabilities, and approximate productivity.  These 
characteristics make it scientifically a valuable industry for study.  The higher is the position of 
the car in the final grid, the more points are awarded to its constructor team.  
In each racing season the number of constructor teams in the Championship can differ.  For 
example, 21 teams competed in 1960, while only 12 were in the Championship in 2011. The 
decline in the number of competing teams is primarily due to the cost associated with the sport 
which has increased over the years.  If in 1950s and 1960s amateur mechanics could enter their 
self-made cars into races, current race car manufacturing requires long-term R&D investments 
and expensive testing, which is affordable only through a narrow circle of sponsors.  The budgets 
of constructor teams are largely secret.  Most of the money is spent on technology which 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
on TV or in the Fédération Internationale de l'Automobile (FIA) – the F1 governing organization, and sometimes 
on Wikipedia. 
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contributes a great deal to a team’s winning prospects (Read, 1997; Wright, 2001; Jenkins, 
2010).  The R&D investment in F1 eventually shows up as new technologies in automobiles that 
the public drive.  
   
4.2 F1 leaders (independent variable) 
As discussed above, we also collected background information about leaders of all F1 
constructors (e.g. Ferrari, McLaren, Williams, Mercedes, etc.) for the same sixty year period, 
1950-2011. The four distinct leader-types are: those who were managers from other industries, 
former engineers (with degrees); those who were formerly mechanics; and, finally, former racing 
drivers.  Leaders are fairly evenly distributed across the four background groups.  More 
precisely, in the history of the industry there were 42 (29.8%) managers, 35 (24.8%) drivers, 31 
(22.0%) mechanics, and 33 (23.4%) engineers.  All leaders in our data were male.
8
 
Despite what might be thought about the possibility of ambiguity in leaders’ classification, 
such cases are rare.  For example, only 7 leaders out of the 141 are classified as mechanics but 
also had competitive driving experience, and 4 leaders who are classified as drivers but also had 
some experience as mechanics.  Several leaders had either multi-level experience or different 
industry experiences.  In the few cases of doubt, leaders were assigned to their type according to 
the highest level of knowledge and primary area of activity.   
We collected the entire population of entries into F1 World Constructors’ Championship.  
Some minor omissions were inevitable.   All team executives listed by the team as ‘principal of 
the racing team’ or ‘team principal’ could be identified as team leaders.  Some teams in F1 
history, however, were managed by several executives, i.e., by collective leaders.  Since the 
focus of this paper is on individual leaders, we excluded those collective leaders from 
                                                          
8
 This is due to the fact that, until the year 2012, women never led F1 teams.   
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consideration (29 collective leaders, 1,351 car entries).  In two further cases we were unable to 
identify team leaders or locate their biographical information.  These observations were also 
excluded (460 car entries).  The resulting dataset, therefore, contains information on 141 
individual leaders who at different points of their lives represented 106 constructor teams and 
entered 17,725 cars into F1 World Constructors’ Championship. 
 
4.3 F1 Grand Prix (dependent variable) 
Our performance data are on podium positions (that is, teams coming number 1-3 in a race).  
Podium places award a team the highest number of points, when compared to finishing lower 
down on a race day, and allow different teams to be compared in a consistent way.  The number 
of races increased in a secular way from 7 in 1950 to 19 in 2011.  A myriad of regulations apply 
in F1 to engine and chassis design, tires, tactics allowed by drivers and so on; noticeably, these 
rules often changed from one season to the next
9
. This does not interfere with our statistical 
inference because the changed rules applied to every team in each championship.  In the later 
econometric analysis, we control for the year of competition and therefore take into account 
these technical alterations from season to season. 
Table 1 summarizes the different championship point systems which have existed in F1 
between 1950 and 2011.  
[INSERT Table 1 HERE] 
 
To allow a consistent measure of performance in the econometric analysis, we therefore use 
the relative final positions of cars in the race (instead of the number of obtained points).  Since 
most points are awarded for podium positions (that is, for finishing 1, 2 or 3 in a particular race), 
                                                          
9
 Jenkins (2010) provides a detailed summary of these changes and their impact on F1 technology. 
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we concentrate on winners of podium positions for each race. Using data on podiums also helps 
us to have a measure of success which is stable through the years of the industry.  
 
4.4 Control variables 
The regression analysis includes variables for other factors that may influence performance.  
We include controls for each race circuit (which may affect race performance due to a specific 
track shape or weather conditions).  There are 71 race circuits in the dataset.  Second, as 
mentioned above, a control is included for each year of competition (1950-2011); this adjusts for 
annual differences in the rules and regulations, which are factors that make F1 such a turbulent 
environment in which to compete.  Third, we adjust for the number of cars competing in each 
race, because those numbers affect competitive pressure.   
Finally, we control for each constructor’s brand by allowing for team fixed effects.  This is a 
particularly important feature of the analysis.  Some constructors perform consistently better than 
others and that fact has to be incorporated into the estimation.  For example, it might be that 
Ferrari or McLaren often outperform others not because they have successful leaders but because 
they have a long history of competing in F1 and thus traditionally had better facilities, more 
sponsorship money, intense public support, and highly experienced human resources.  To 
calculate the influence of leaders, we need to control for these background differences.  In the 
econometric analysis, therefore, a separate variable is included for each constructor brand (one 
for Ferrari, one for Red Bull, one for McLaren, etc.).     
It might be expected that the amount of money each constructor spends would have an 
impact on outcomes.  Unfortunately, teams do not release information about their budgets.  
Nevertheless, it has been possible for us to locate teams’ financial investment for a small number 
of years (2006 and 2008).  We include these results in a separate regression table in Appendix 2.  
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Importantly, the table shows that inclusion of constructor money does not affect our key findings 
about leader type (see Appendix 2). 
Explanatory variables used in our regression analysis are summarized in Table 2.   
 
[INSERT Table 2 HERE] 
Descriptive statistics  
Summary statistics are presented in Table 3.  They show that between 1950 and 2011 the 
highest numbers of cars were entered by constructor teams led by former mechanics (7,456), 
which is explained by a statistical over-representation of mechanics in the early years of famous 
teams.  The statistics reveal that podium frequency (i.e., winning a first, second or third place in 
a race) and average wins frequency (i.e., coming first in a race) are more prevalent among teams 
headed by drivers and mechanics as compared with managers or engineers.  Drivers and 
mechanics also have higher average pole frequencies (finishing first in the qualifying, and, as a 
result, starting the race at the very front of the grid) and average fastest lap (showing the fastest 
time in the race on any given lap). 
[INSERT Table 3 HERE] 
 
In our dataset, the mean propensity to gain a podium position is 0.14 and the standard 
deviation is 0.34.  Therefore, on average, a constructor team has a 14% chance per race of 
winning a podium.  
The mean values in Columns 4 and 5 of Table 3 reveal that the most successful leaders were 
former drivers closely followed by mechanics.  Drivers are associated with a winning team in 7% 
of races, and they garner a podium position in 17% of races.  The performance of teams led by 
mechanics is similar (winning 6% of the time, and getting podiums 16% of the time).  Teams 
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headed by leaders of a manager type obtain worse results: they win 3% of races and obtain 
podium positions in 12% of the races.  Constructor teams led by engineers fare even less well: 
3% wins and 8% podiums.  Similar patterns are found for average pole frequency and average 
fastest lap frequency.  These findings are represented in Table 3. 
Although the raw patterns reported in Table 3 are of interest, they should not be interpreted 
in too literal a way. The data provide a preliminary summary without accounting for any control 
variables. Those variables potentially have an important impact on teams’ performance and, 
therefore, may interact with leaders’ types. 
 
5. Econometric Analysis and Results 
In this section we use econometric analysis to test the hypotheses in Section 3.  
 
5.1 The impact of leader types on organizational performance 
We explore whether constructor teams’ performance in F1 depends on leaders’ types.  In 
each of the regressions, the dependent variable is a measure of the performance of the team 
based on the final position of each car in every race. The key explanatory variable is a leader’s 
classification (that is, former: manager, driver, mechanic or engineer).  Finally we include 
control variables for each constructor, the race track, the number of cars competing and each race 
year.  
As reported earlier, the raw data revealed a simple pattern: that two leader-types appear to be 
associated with the most wins and podium positions.  We therefore begin with a preliminary 
analysis by dividing the data into these two groups: drivers and mechanics, and managers and 
engineers.  We begin with a simple ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator.  Model 1 in Table 4 
reports an OLS regression model without control variables and then provides results with 
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controls in Models 2-5. Table 4 treats the data in a cardinal way and estimates an ordinary least 
squares linear probability model.  The dependent variable    {   } records whether a particular 
car   has won a podium in a race (    ) or did not win a podium in the race (    ). 
 
[INSERT Table 4 HERE] 
 
Column 1 of Table 4 reports results of an OLS regression model in which a dummy variable 
is entered for leaders classified as drivers or mechanics.  Since    is a simple binary variable, the 
estimated coefficients of this dummy, in the first column of Table 4, give estimates of the effects 
of drivers or mechanics as compared with managers or engineers on the propensity to gain a 
podium position.  In each row, the base category is that of manager or engineer.
 
 
In Table 4 the coefficient on driver or mechanic in Column 1 is 0.066 (with a t-statistic of 
12.56, which implies that the null hypothesis of a zero coefficient can be rejected at 0.001 level).  
Because the mean probability of securing a podium position for teams headed by leaders of all 
types is approximately 14%, a coefficient of 0.066 implies that having former driver or mechanic 
as a leader increases a team’s propensity to win a podium position by 6% yielding the mean 
propensity of approximately 20%. 
The remaining columns of Table 4 report specifications after we add control variables to the 
basic regression analysis.  These include the circuit where the race is taking place, the year of 
competition, the constructor team a particular car represents, and finally, the total number of cars 
that participate in the race.  
Column 2 of Table 4 reveals that after controlling for the circuit, it is drivers and mechanics 
compared with managers and engineers that are associated with a higher propensity of winning a 
podium position: the t statistic is 12.50 (p<0.001).  In columns 3-5 as we add more controls for 
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the year of competition, constructor team dummies, and number of cars in each race, the results 
remain stable.  Overall, Table 4 shows that drivers and mechanics are associated with better 
organizational performance compared with managers and engineers. 
Results of the basic analysis reported in Table 4 do not allow us to single out how much of an 
effect individual leaders’ unobserved heterogeneity has on the propensity of constructor teams to 
gain podium positions controlling for leader types.  The dataset has a specific form: each leader 
(within each constructor team) enters two cars in multiple races within each year. Some leaders 
(constructor teams) compete in many seasons whereas others drop out after participating in the 
Championship for one year. Therefore, our dataset represents an unbalanced panel which has 
more than one observation for each leader within each time period.  So that we can incorporate 
individual underlying differences (unobserved heterogeneity) at the level of each leader -- to 
account for the binary nature of the dependent variable (winning or not winning a podium 
position) and to make use of the complex structure of our panel dataset -- we use a multilevel 
probit regression specified in the following way (see Snijders & Bosker, 1999 for details). 
Assume that the dichotomous dependent variable   is produced by a threshold model with 
underlying variable  ̃ given by 
 ̃     ∑       
 
               (1) 
where       are explanatory variables;          are coefficients. Variance   
 =1 and the 
variance of the random intercept   
  is estimated jointly with the coefficients. Log-likelihood is 
approximated using Gauss–Hermite quadrature. The results from this multilevel probit 
regression were similar to those in Table (there are available from the authors on request). 
We also estimate the effect of each leader type (managers, drivers, mechanics and engineers) 
separately.  We run models with unobserved individual heterogeneity at the level of each leader. 
Table 5 reports the results of the probit estimations which include several confounding variables 
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(shown in Table 2).  In these estimations, we are interested in determining the probability of 
team leaders with different backgrounds (manager, driver, mechanic, and engineer) securing a 
podium position for their teams.  The impact of leaders’ types on propensity to gain a podium 
position (1-3) is measured compared to that of manager (the omitted base category). 
 
[INSERT Table 5 HERE] 
 
In Table 5, the probit model in Column 1 controls only for each Grand Prix circuit (71 
circuits).  Compared to managers, teams headed by drivers are statistically more likely to win a 
podium position, irrespective of the influence of the circuit.  The coefficient is slightly greater 
than 0.20 (z-statistic 5.09, p<0.001).  Mechanic-leaders are a little less influential – coefficient is 
less than 0.20 and z-statistic 6.01, p<0.001).  In Table 5 engineers have a statistically 
significantly negative effect on obtaining first, second or third place in a Grand Prix (coefficient 
approximately -0.24; z-statistic -5.99, p<0.001). 
Column 2 of Table 5 extends the set of independent variables.  It includes controls for both 
the circuit and each year in our dataset (1950 to 2011).  This new addition of the year dummies 
does not change the results appreciably.  Drivers and mechanics have a statistically significant 
effect on the probability of a podium position, whereas engineers have a negative influence. 
The results change noticeably in the specification of Column 3 in Table 5.  Here we include 
constructor dummies.  Teams like Ferrari show up strongly – with large coefficients.  Between 
1950 and 2011 Ferrari won 16 World Constructors Championships – more than any other team 
in the history of F1.  The constructors’ effects on race performance are evident in the seven-fold 
increase in the pseudo-R
2
 which rises in Table 5 from approximately 0.02 in Columns 1 and 2, to 
0.14 after the addition of team fixed-effects. 
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Column 3 of Table 5 illustrates an important finding: drivers now have a statistically 
significant and positive effect on the probability of a podium position; the effect of mechanic-
leaders is now insignificant, while engineer-leaders remain negative and insignificant.  In this 
estimation, the coefficient on drivers goes up slightly and equals to approximately 0.29 (z-
statistic 4.71, p<0.001).  The results in the last column of Table 5, with the inclusion of the 
fourth potential confounding variable -- the number of cars qualifying in each race -- remains 
similar to those in Column 3.  We check the robustness of our results by estimating several 
multilevel probit models. These results are qualitatively similar (and available from the authors 
on request).   
A further check is whether there is a home-race effect.  One of our regression variables 
allows us to control for the impact of a specific circuit. The home-race effect accounts for the 
possibility that constructors may have competitive advantage if the race circuit is in the same 
country where the team headquarters are located.  Constructors may be more likely to win a 
podium position in their home country (akin to the home-effect in soccer for example).  To 
control for the home-race effect, we first compare the frequencies of winning a home race versus 
winning a race abroad for our entire sample of car entries.  We find no relationship between the 
average frequency of winning a podium position at home as compared with abroad.
10
 
 
5.2 The impact of the length of leader’s racing experience on performance 
The findings in Tables 4-5 suggest that former drivers and mechanics are statistically more 
likely to lead their constructor teams to win podium positions.  Our hypothesis that improved 
performance is associated with leader-characteristics that most closely align with the core-
business activity, can now be examined in a new test.  Here the focus is on the number of years 
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 Tables and estimations reporting this result are available from the authors upon request. 
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leaders spent in competitive racing.   This might be viewed as akin to executive tenure, which the 
upper echelons literature suggests can be used as a proxy for a number of factors (for example, 
cognition, knowledge, interest and power), that influence a leader’s decision making and 
performance (Hambrick & Fukutomi, 1991).  The results from our time-in-industry estimations 
are reported in Table 6.   
Interestingly, in Table 6, the length of the previous experience of the leader as a competitive 
driver has a positive and highly significant effect on performance in all estimations.  Overall, 
leaders’ unobserved heterogeneity within each race accounts for about 30% of variation in 
winning a podium position when we do not control for the constructor team (e.g., standard 
deviation of variability of leader’s individual effects are equal to 0.302 in Model 1 in Table 6).  
However, once we add controls for the constructor teams, the individual effect of each leader 
within each race decreases significantly suggesting that accounting for constructor team is very 
important (e.g., standard deviation of variability of leader’s individual effects are equal to 0.135 
in Model 3 in Table 6). 
In Table 6 we also present estimations for all leaders with previous experience of practicing 
as a mechanic (in our dataset there are 31 leaders classified as mechanics; but also 4 drivers and 
6 engineers who also spent some time as mechanics). We use equation (2) where    
  is the 
leader’s year of experience as mechanic in the past and    
     
  are explanatory variables 
capturing circuit, year, constructor and number of cars in each race       are marginal effects 
and    is a vector depicting unobserved individual heterogeneity at the level of every leader in 
each season.  Unlike former drivers’ experience, mechanics’ experience appears to have a 
negative effect on performance.  This result is significant in all three models presented in Table 
6. This suggests that while having mechanical experience per se is a positive factor for team 
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performance, as shown by our previous analysis, the length of a leader’s experience as a 
mechanic fails to improve team results.  
Part of the explanation for these findings may be that mechanical experience does increase 
knowledge in the core industry, but it is not alone a sufficient condition for performance 
improvement when present on its own. Ability in the core business activity also appears to be 
necessary.  Mechanics likely concentrate on the technical side of developing a car, thus when 
they become leaders they may be able to effectively communicate technical information to their 
subordinates.  However, former drivers understand how technology may directly affect driving 
ability as well as strategic component of racing.     
 
5.3 The impact of the leader on the key follower – the driver 
To this point, the analysis has suggested that the length of leader’s previous experience in 
competitive driving has a significant positive impact on organizational performance in F1 
constructor teams: the higher is a leader’s experience as a driver in the past, the more likely his 
team is to win a podium position in a given race.  Yet, it is interesting to consider the impact of a 
leader’s previous experience on team performance not only separately, but also in conjunction 
with the performance of key followers (drivers who compete for the team).  This addresses 
hypothesis 3.   
In recent years, constructor teams compete with two cars in each Grand Prix race; however, 
the number of cars per team has varied throughout F1 history between 1 and 2. Since each 
observation in our dataset is a car entry, driven by a particular F1 driver and representing a 
specific F1 constructor team, which takes part in the F1 Constructor Championship, we can look 
at a combination of leader-driver performance for each entry in our dataset. We consider the 
length of a leader’s experience as a competitive driver in the past in conjunction with the length 
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of experience of drivers who currently compete for this leader’s team. We look at each current 
driver’s experience as a competitive driver in F1.11 
For one leader in the dataset, it was not possible to identify drivers.  We have thus excluded 
those 7 car entries from the analysis. Therefore, the resulting data for the analysis of leader-
driver experience combinations consisted of 140 leaders, 662 drivers, and 17,718 car entries.  
In the remaining dataset, there is considerable individual heterogeneity in terms of length of 
experience both among 140 leaders (the length of experience ranges from no experience to 17 
years of experience with the mean of 7.3 years, standard deviation of 5.1 years and the median of 
7 years) and 662 drivers (the length of experience also ranges from no experience to 17 years of 
experience with the mean of 3.8 years, standard deviation of 3.4 years and the median of 3 
years). In order to simplify the analysis and construct a sensible number of leader-driver 
experience combinations, we identify 3 cohorts of leaders and 3 cohorts of drivers dependent on 
the length of their experience. 
We distinguish between the following cohorts of leaders: 
 Leader None (dr) – leader’s previous experience as a competitive driver is equal to 0 
years; 
 Leader Medium (dr) – leader’s previous experience as a competitive driver is equal to 1 
to 5 years; 
 Leader Long (dr) – leader’s previous experience as a competitive driver is greater than 5 
years. 
At the same time, we identify 3 cohorts of drivers: 
 Driver None – driver’s previous experience as a competitive driver in Formula 1 is equal 
to 0 years; 
                                                          
11
 Note that while a leader’s experience is measured as number of years a leader participated in various competitions 
(not only F1) as a competitive driver before becoming an F1 team principal. At the same time, a current driver’s 
experience is measured as an experience of a particular driver in F1 competition to the date of a given race. 
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 Driver Medium – driver’s previous experience as a competitive driver in Formula 1 is 
equal to 1 to 5 years; 
 Driver Long – driver’s previous experience as a competitive driver in Formula 1 is 
greater than 5 years 
 
While each leader’s cohort does not change throughout the dataset (because we take into 
account leaders’ experience before they have become principals in F1), drivers may move from 
the cohort DN to the cohort DM and then to the cohort DL throughout the dataset (because they 
gain experience from one year to the next as long as they stay in F1). Given these cohorts, we 
can identify 9 combinations of leader-driver experiences: 
 
1. LN(dr)-DN: 1654 (9%) experience combinations from 1950 to 2011; 
2. LN(dr)-DM: 615 (3%) experience combinations from 1950 to 2011; 
3. LN(dr)-DL: 530 (3%) experience combinations from 1950 to 2011; 
4. LM(dr)-DN: 6710 (38%) experience combinations from 1950 to 2011; 
5. LM(dr)-DM: 1547 (9%) experience combinations from 1950 to 2011; 
6. LM(dr)-DL: 2020 (11%) experience combinations from 1950 to 2011; 
7. LL(dr)-DN: 3296 (19%) experience combinations from 1950 to 2011; 
8. LL(dr)-DM: 276 (2%) experience combinations from 1950 to 2011; 
9. LL(dr)-DL: 1070 (6%) experience combinations from 1950 to 2011. 
 
To explore the extent to which these effects are observed in the data, we conduct a clustered 
conditional logit regression without and with control variables (circuit individual effects, year of 
competition, constructor individual effects, number of cars in a race).  The dependent variable is 
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the correlation between podiums and combinations of leader-driver experience (a categorical 
variable with base category combination LN(dr)-DN).  Standard errors are clustered at the level 
of each individual leader (140 clusters in our dataset).  Results of these clustered logit 
regressions are reported in Table 7.  
 
[INSERT Table 7 HERE] 
 
According to Table 7, the combination LL(dr)-DL is more likely to win a podium position than 
any other combination. Combinations where leaders have medium or long previous driving 
experience are more likely to reach podiums than combinations where leaders do not have 
previous driving experience.  Furthermore, regression results suggest that leaders’ experience as 
a competitive driver in the past seems to matter more than the F1 racing experience of the current 
drivers. In Model 5 with all 4 control variables, the coefficients for combinations with LN(dr) 
range between -0.78 to -0.27, whereas the coefficients for combinations with LM(dr) range 
between 0.83 and 1.32 and coefficients for combinations with LL(dr) range between 0.82 and 
1.53.
12
  
The results tell us that highly experienced leaders paired with highly experienced drivers 
(combination LL(dr)-DL) gain podiums in 21% of cases (more frequently than any other leader-
driver combination).  However, it is notable that when a highly experienced leader is paired with 
a rookie driver (combination LL(dr)-DN), the team reaches podium positions in 19% of cases.  
This finding is noteworthy because it suggests, first, that only a small difference exists between 
pairing an experienced F1 driver with a driver-leader (2%), and, second, that leaders with 
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 The same results are obtained in regressions where the dependent variable is the propensity to win a race. 
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previous driving experience work more effectively with rookie drivers than with those who have 
1 to 5 years of driving experience in F1.  Figure 2 represents the regression results in a matrix.   
 
6. Discussion 
The evidence presented above reveals that the expert leader pattern has been found in a new 
setting: six decades of the F1 global industry. Leaders who were former drivers are shown to 
have the greatest later success.  To understand why and how driver-leaders might affect 
performance is an empirical issue; our dataset does not allow us to causally uncover the 
underlying details of the transfer processes.  Nevertheless, a helpful part of theory development 
is to make predictions about why and how these patterns exist, that can be investigated in future 
research.   
Our data exclude important information -- for example, management skills, which are 
positively associated with organizational performance (Bloom & Van Reenen, 2007; Bloom, 
Genakos, Martin & Sadun, 2010).  It is natural to assume that F1 principals vary in their 
individual management and leadership skills.  Might drivers make better leaders because of 
(unmeasured) personality or traits as opposed to expert knowledge?
13
  This is an important 
conceptual possibility and it seems valuable that future research attempt to scrutinize it in depth.  
But a number of pieces of evidence currently appear to point against such an interpretation.  
It is not feasible to measure the personality types of each driver -- many of whom are no 
longer alive -- in this historical dataset.  However, one reason to be cautious about the hypothesis 
of an overwhelming influence from personality is that former mechanics also perform relatively 
well as F1 principals.  It is not clear why the personality of mechanics and drivers would be 
similar to each other.  Second, and perhaps more important, within the sub-sample of everyone 
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 We would like to thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion. 
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who ever drove, we find that individuals with the longest racing experience make the best 
leaders.  This seems powerfully suggestive of the role of mature expertise rather than solely of 
personality or traits (though personality might be somewhat implicated in the ability to be driver 
for a large rather than medium number of years).  When a leader has 10 years of racing 
experience instead of zero years, it translates, according to the data, into a 16 percentage points 
higher probability of the leader’s team gaining a podium position – this is after controlling for 
the race circuit, the race year, each constructor, and the number of cars that qualified.  If race 
drivers have similar personality traits we would not expect such large differences within the 
group.  Finally, we can run an empirical test that may add weight to the arguments in support of 
knowledge over sheer personality.  We can ask: do drivers who are in constructor teams led by 
former-drivers, versus other leaders, crash less or more in Grand Prix races?   We find that cars 
in teams led by leaders with no previous driving experience on average crash in 12%-15% of 
cases, whereas cars in teams led by leaders with high levels of experience crash in 10%-13% of 
cases14.  Caution is necessary here when drawing conclusions, but one interpretation is that this 
interaction result may be explained by expert knowledge -- in a way quite independent of 
personality -- that is transferred from the leader to the way the team performs. 
 
6.1 Why former drivers make better F1 leaders: possible transfer processes 
The core-business activity in F1 is racing to win championship points.  We label expert 
leaders as those whose knowledge and experience aligns with the organization’s core-business 
activity.  Examples summarized above include: university presidents who have strong research 
records who lead research universities (Goodall 2009a,b); basketball coaches who were 
themselves star players in the NBA (Goodall, Kahn & Oswald. 2011), and so on.   We suggest 
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 We use a Kruskal-Wallis test and find statistically significance at 0.0004 level.  Due to space restrictions we have 
not included a table.  
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that former drivers are highly competent in the core-business activity of racing.  That drivers are 
important to F1 constructors is evident in their wages
15
.  It is usual for drivers to receive the 
highest salaries in F1 teams.    
In this section we propose 4 possible reasons why former drivers may improve team 
performance.  The theoretical suggestion is that these ideas can be generalized into all settings 
where the expert leader results have been established.   
 
a) Drivers occupy a unique position in the team because they can view all elements of the F1 
process; it is the drivers who feed back information about new adaptations to the chassis, engine, 
tires and other car modifications after races.  F1 team principals who had long driving careers, 
may have gone on to become exceptional leaders because their own career preferences and 
priorities continue to be aligned with the requirements of the core business of F1 Championships.  
It is normal for drivers to start racing at an early age, usually go-karting as young children. 
Possibly because of their early start in racing, driver-leaders develop expert knowledge about the 
underlying activity of Grand Prix racing; they acquire extensive experience in formulating 
driving tactics, and may be better able to make decisions under time pressure and stress.   Having 
specialized knowledge about racing might help a leader to use their superior strategic knowledge 
to make better strategic choices.  In addition, they may be better able to effectively communicate 
strategy to any part of the team.  
 
b) Drivers form relationships with all parts of the team. They may also act as role models, 
and better understand how to coax high performance out of others.  In the context of North 
American professional basketball, Goodall et al. (2011) argued that having been a former top 
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 Salaries for 2013 available at: http://www.tsmplug.com/richlist/highest-paid-formula-1-drivers/ 
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basketball player helps those who become coaches to better manage the egos of their top players.  
It might be presumed that a leader who has spent time undertaking the core-business activity 
would have a good understanding about the requisite conditions required for other core workers.  
Thus, we might expect driver-leaders to create an appropriate work environment, which in turn 
may influence employee performance.  This is supported by the findings from the creativity 
literature, summarized in Mumford et al. 2002, that suggests leaders need technical expertise to 
fully evaluate the ideas of other creative people and provide appropriate feedback.   
 
c) Because of their proven track record, former drivers may command more respect; they 
may be viewed as intrinsically credible since they have ‘walked-the-walk’.  Credibility, it is 
argued, legitimizes leaders’ authority and extends their influence (Bass, 1985; Bennis & Nanus, 
1985; Kouzes & Posner, 2003; Mumford, et al., 2002).  Having been ‘one of them’ may also 
signal to future employees that a driver-leader understands the culture and value system, 
incentives and motivations of their F1 team colleagues (Goodall 2009a; Goodall et al., 2011).  
Hence, may choose to join the team.  Hiring an expert leader may also signpost credibility to a 
wider audience.  For example, it may send out a signal about strategic priorities to external 
stakeholders such as sponsors, shareholders, customers, suppliers, and the media.  To enter a 
team in Formula 1 is expensive (approximate annual cost is $200-$300 million).  Therefore, the 
role of external funders, particularly sponsors, is centrally important.   
 
d) Finally, the credibility generated by having driven successfully may also help to attract 
new talented personnel.  Arguably, hiring the best people is central to the success of any 
organization.  A leader who has raced successfully and has been in the industry for many years 
might make more informed hiring decisions.   They may also be hooked into important networks.   
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7. Conclusion 
The claim that is developed further in this paper is that organizations led by individuals who 
have expert knowledge of the core business go on to make better leaders.  Expert knowledge is 
described as being a first-order requirement, because it may be generalizable across different 
industries and be more easily identified and measured, compared with other factors such as style 
or personality. Expert knowledge in the core business has, it is suggested, two components: 
industry experience and expert ability in the core business activity (holding constant the level of 
management and leadership experience). These ideas form the nascent theory of expert 
leadership.   
This paper makes two contributions: first, it summarizes the extant literature supporting the 
expert leader hypothesis and, based on these findings, makes theoretical claims in support of a 
generalized concept of expert leadership.  Second, it makes an empirical contribution; it takes a 
new step towards an understanding of the boundaries of the expert-leader assertions by testing 
them in the extreme high-technology turbulent industry of Formula One (F1) -- a setting where 
leadership has not before been examined.   
The data collected for this study provide longitudinal information on the entire history of F1.  
We have every leader in the 62 year history of F1 between 1950 and 2011.  The dataset offers the 
unusual advantage of half a century of objective organizational outcomes against which to 
determine the kinds of leaders associated with optimal performance.   
Four leader classifications emerged from our data: former managers who came from 
industries outside F1, former engineers (with degrees), those who were previously mechanics, 
and former racing drivers.  Our taxonomy, in Figure 1, suggests that expert knowledge is least 
evident in former managers and most likely in former drivers.  To test our hypotheses (in Section 
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3), we use econometric methods. These allow us to compare teams’ performance and determine 
whether and to what extent leaders’ competence in the core-business activity (driving) affects 
later team performance.  We include a number of control variables in the analyses -- the race 
circuit, the race year, the different constructors (Ferrari, McLaren, Red Bull etc.), and the number 
of cars qualified.  We also test for the effect of money. 
As predicted, managers and engineers on average perform least successfully as F1 team 
leaders.  Principals who were mechanics performed well, though less well overall compared with 
former drivers.  In our regression tables, we find, first, that F1 leaders who were former racing 
drivers and mechanics are associated with the most success in winning podium positions in 
Grand Prix races.  Second, among the sub-sample of leaders who have ever driven competitively, 
it is leaders who spent the most years racing -- arguably the most successful drivers -- who 
secure the best results for their F1 teams.   We argue that a long racing career might be viewed as 
an equivalent to, or proxy for, executive tenure or time-in-industry.   
Finally, and perhaps notably, we attempt to discern the effects that different leaders have on 
what might be considered their key employees – the team drivers.  To do this, which we believe 
to be the first analysis of its kind, we consider interactions between leaders’ former driving 
experience and the F1 racing experience of the current team driver.  The evidence suggests that 
in most circumstances the driving experience of the principal matters more to team performance 
than the F1 driving experience of the current driver.  A highly experienced driver-leader paired 
with a highly experienced F1 driver gains podiums in 21% of cases (more frequently than any 
other leader-driver combination).  However, when a highly experienced driver-leader is paired 
with a rookie driver, the team reaches podium positions in 19% of cases.  This finding seems 
striking because it suggests, first, that only a small difference exists between pairing an 
experienced F1 driver with a driver-leader (2%), and, second, that leaders with previous driving 
37 
 
experience work more effectively with rookie drivers than with those who have 1 to 5 years of 
driving experience in F1.   Leaders who have never raced have the least influence, no matter how 
much F1 racing experience their driver previously achieved.  This is an interesting result because 
it is a sharp signal that leaders matter.   
This paper adds information to the literature examining the influence that leaders have on 
organizational performance, specifically the size of the effect.  The estimated effect that former 
drivers have on constructor performance is noteworthy: 10 years of experience instead of zero 
years is associated with an extra 0.16 on the dependent variable.  That translates into a 16 
percentage point higher probability of the leader’s team winning a podium position (after the 
inclusion of control variables for race track, race year, constructor type, and number of cars).  
The extra probability of gaining a podium position when a driver has had a decade’s experience 
of competitive racing is about one-in-seven, which corresponds to a doubling of the effect 
compared with the mean podium frequency in the data of 0.14.   
Within the limitations of our historical dataset we cannot explain precisely why the F1 
leaders who were drivers outperformed other leaders in the six decades of F1.  Nevertheless, we 
discuss possible explanations and how they may contribute to a general theory of expert 
leadership.  For example, we suggest that drivers sit in a unique position that allows them to 
view every part of the F1 process.  They begin racing as children and then learn how to 
formulate driving tactics and acquire extensive technical knowledge from an early age. This we 
believe may contribute later to strategy development.  Former drivers may also appear more 
credible to members of their teams, and those ex-drivers may know, from their deep acquired 
experience, how to create an appropriate work environment for other team members.   
Caution is advisable in the interpretation of any observational study in social science.  It is 
sensible to recall that -- though we have collected the entire longitudinal history of F1 and not a 
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snap-shot -- at this level of disaggregation any leader sub-samples necessarily become relatively 
small.  Hence care is needed in the assessment of results.  Despite such limitations, our findings 
have made it possible to consider the expert-leader hypothesis in a new real-world setting. This 
iconic backdrop helps us to understand further its strengths, boundaries, and possible 
generalizability.   
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Figure 1 
 
F1 leaders who have expert knowledge (industry experience and ability in the  
core-business activity) are associated with better organizational performance. 
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Figure 2 
The influence, in different settings, of leaders who were themselves F1 drivers 
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Table 1  
The relationship between F1 Champion points and the final position of cars  
 
 
 
Championship point system  
Final 
position 
1950-1959 1960 1961-1990 1991-2002 2003-2009 2010-2011 
1950-2011 
(averages) 
1
st
 8 8 9 10 10 25 11.7 
2
nd
 6 6 6 6 8 18 8.3 
3
rd
 4 4 4 4 6 15 6.2 
4
th
 3 3 3 3 5 12 4.8 
5
th
 2 2 2 2 4 10 3.7 
6
th
 0 1 1 1 3 8 2.3 
7
th
 0 0 0 0 2 6 1.3 
8
th
 0 0 0 0 1 4 0.8 
9
th
 0 0 0 0 0 2 0.3 
10
th
 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.2 
 
 
Table 2 
Explanatory variables in the regression equations* 
 
Explanatory variable Description 
CONSTANT Constant 
MANAGER 1 if the leader is classified as manager; 0 otherwise 
DRIVER 1 if the leader is classified as driver; 0 otherwise 
MECHANIC 1 if leader is classified as mechanic; 0 otherwise 
ENGINEER 1 if the leader is classified as engineer; 0 otherwise 
CIRCUIT Each Grand Prix circuit has a different dummy  
YEAR Each year has a different dummy 
TEAM Each F1 constructor team has a dummy 
# CARS Number of cars qualified to race in any particular race 
 
*All executives listed by the team as ‘principal of the racing team’ or ‘team principal’ are identified as 
team leaders.  Those identified as having collective team leaders (more than one person) are excluded (29 
leaders, 1,351 car entries).  We also excluded 460 car entries in cases where we were unable to identify 
leaders.   
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Table 3  
Summary statistics on the Formula 1 World Constructors’ Championship 1950-2011 
 
Leaders’ 
type 
Number of 
leaders 
Number of 
cars 
Average 
podium 
frequency 
Average 
win 
frequency 
Average 
pole 
frequency 
Average 
fastest lap 
frequency 
Managers 42 3,498 0.12 0.03 0.03 0.04 
Drivers 35 2,779 0.17 0.07 0.07 0.06 
Mechanics 31 7,456 0.16 0.06 0.05 0.06 
Engineers 33 3,992 0.08 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Total 141 17,725 0.14 0.05 0.05 0.05 
 
 
Table 4 
Regression results where the dependent variable is whether a car gets  
a podium position – estimated by an OLS linear probability model  
 
Explanatory variable 
Model 1 
coefficient 
(standard 
error) 
Model 2 
coefficient 
(standard 
error) 
Model 3 
coefficient 
(standard 
error) 
Model 4 
coefficient 
(standard 
error) 
Model 5 
coefficient 
(standard 
error) 
Driver or mechanic 
   0.066*** 
(0.005) 
    0.066*** 
(0.005) 
   0.066*** 
(0.005) 
    0.042*** 
(0.008) 
    0.044*** 
(0.0083) 
Manager or engineer - - - - - 
      
CIRCUIT dummies included NO YES YES YES YES 
YEAR dummies included NO NO YES YES YES 
TEAM dummies included NO NO NO YES YES 
# CARS included NO NO NO NO YES 
 
 
    
R
2 0.0088 0.0102 0.0103 0.1305 0.1308 
N (Observations) 17725 17725 17725 17725 17725 
N (Leaders) 141 141 141 141 141 
*** - significant at 0.001 level 
The mean of the dependent variable (gaining a podium position) is 0.14. 
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                                                                      Table 5 
Regression equations where the dependent variable is whether  
a car gains a podium position - estimated by a probit model  
 
Explanatory variable 
Model 1 
coefficient 
(standard 
error) 
Model 2 
coefficient 
(standard 
error) 
Model 3 
coefficient 
(standard 
error) 
Model 4 
coefficient 
(standard 
error) 
MANAGER 
    
DRIVER 
  0.202*** 
(0.040) 
  0.205*** 
(0.040) 
   0.292*** 
(0.062) 
  0.300*** 
(0.062) 
MECHANIC 
0.197*** 
(0.033) 
0.191*** 
(0.033) 
0.021 
(0.063) 
0.035 
(0.063) 
ENGINEER 
 -0.242*** 
(0.040) 
  -0.252*** 
(0.041) 
 -0.115 
(0.071) 
-0.118 
(0.072) 
 
  
  
CIRCUIT dummies included YES YES YES YES 
YEAR dummies included NO YES YES YES 
TEAM dummies included NO NO YES YES 
# CARS included NO NO NO YES 
     Pseudo R
2 
0.0156 0.0160 0.1404 0.1409 
N (Observations) 17725 17725 17725 17725 
N (Leaders) 141 141 141 141 
*** - significant at 0.001 level  
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Table 6 
Regression equations where the dependent variable is whether a car gains a podium 
position -- estimated by random intercept logit model -- in the subsample of leaders who 
have ever had competitive driving experience¹ and experience as mechanic
2
 
 
Explanatory variable 
Model 1 
marginal 
effect 
(standard 
error) 
Model 1 
marginal 
effect 
(standard 
error) 
Model 2 
marginal 
effect 
(standard 
error) 
Model 2 
marginal 
effect 
(standard 
error) 
Model 3 
marginal 
effect 
(standard 
error) 
Model 3 
marginal 
effect 
(standard 
error) 
Leader’s years of experience as 
a competitive driver in the past 
  0.106*** 
(0.012) 
- 
  0.113*** 
(0.013) 
- 
  0.073*** 
(0.022) 
- 
Leader’s years of experience as 
a mechanic in the past 
- 
  -0.028*** 
(0.005) 
- 
  -0.081*** 
(0.005) 
- 
  -0.025** 
(0.008) 
Leader in each season individual 
effect: st. deviation (st. error) 
1.854 
(0.302) 
1.449 
(0.098) 
1.598 
(0.220) 
1.651 
(0.141) 
1.103 
(0.135) 
1.196 
(0.083) 
CIRCUIT dummies included NO NO YES YES YES YES 
YEAR dummies included NO NO YES YES YES YES 
TEAM dummies included NO NO NO NO YES YES 
# CARS included NO NO NO NO YES YES  
 
      
Log likelihood (LL)
 -1617.88 -4477.96 -1599.18 -4426.86 -1494.93 -4273.87 
N (Observations) 6061 8725 6061 8725 6061 8725 
N (Leaders) 45 41 45 41 45 41 
*** - significant at 0.001 level  
 
¹ The data include 45 leaders out of 141 (33%) who have entered 6,061 cars in 803 out of 858 races in F1 
competitions between 1950 and 2011. These are leaders who have ever had a competitive driving 
experience. Out of them, 35 are classified as drivers, 7 as mechanics, 2 as managers, and 1 as engineer. 
2
 The data include 41 leaders out of 141 (29%) who have entered 8,725 cars in F1 competitions between 
1950 and 2011. These are leaders who have ever had experience as mechanics. Out of them, 31 are 
classified as mechanics, 4 as drivers, 6 as engineers. 
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Table 7 
Results of clustered conditional logit regression without and with controls (correlation 
between podiums and combinations of leader-driver experience). Leader’s experience is 
measured as leader’s previous experience as competitive driver. 
Base category: combination LN(dr)-DN. 
[Dependent variable: whether a car won a podium position or not] 
 
Combination 
Model 1 
coefficient 
(robust 
standard 
error) 
Model 2 
coefficient 
(robust 
standard 
error) 
Model 3 
coefficient 
(robust 
standard 
error) 
Model 4 
coefficient 
(robust 
standard 
error) 
Model 1 
coefficient 
(robust 
standard 
error) 
      
LN(dr)-DN 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
LN(dr)-DM 
-0.6589917   
(0.7469524) 
-0.6775477   
(0.7252807) 
-0.6620999   
(0.7095704) 
-0.2799302   
(0.4221312) 
-0.2731413   
(0.4182238) 
LN(dr)-DL 
-2.092188***    
(0.415654) 
-2.048483***   
(0.4251668) 
-1.986393***   
(0.4528088) 
-0.7888245    
(0.549179) 
-0.7760258    
(0.538188) 
LM(dr)-DN 
1.037523***   
(0.1839944) 
1.066706***   
(0.1802005) 
1.089532***   
(0.1794364) 
0.6934863***   
(0.2026239) 
0.695632***   
(0.2015751) 
LM(dr)-DM 
0.8386818†   
(0.4902904) 
0.8324678†    
(0.478085) 
0.8398051†   
(0.4633605) 
0.8348534*    
(0.396006) 
0.8328638*   
(0.3944819) 
LM(dr)-DL 
0.7735891†   
(0.4166392) 
0.8230227*    
(0.425948) 
0.8759659*   
(0.4386714) 
1.312192***   
(0.2432113) 
1.324331***   
(0.2390952) 
LL(dr)-DN 
1.353978***   
(0.1951035) 
1.408388***   
(0.1784429) 
1.45925***   
(0.1730723) 
0.8919771***   
(0.2145238) 
0.9091598***   
(0.2125711) 
LL(dr)-DM 
0.565194   
(0.7308702) 
0.5926472   
(0.7375657) 
0.6422772    
(0.728222) 
0.8009291   
(0.5251208) 
0.8203238   
(0.5367398) 
LL(dr)-DL 
1.474793*   
(0.7149445) 
1.518909*   
(0.7060216) 
1.594736*   
(0.7115901) 
1.529971***   
(0.3816751) 
1.525973***   
(0.3739136) 
      
CIRCUIT dummies included NO YES YES YES YES 
YEAR dummies included NO NO YES YES YES 
TEAM dummies included NO NO NO YES YES 
# CARS included NO NO NO NO YES 
      
Pseudo R
2
 0.0322 0.0348 0.0358 0.1497 0.1500 
      
N (Observations) 17718 17718 17718 17718 17718 
Clustered at the level of 
individual leader 
(140 clusters) 
YES YES YES YES YES 
Abbreviations: LN(dr) – leader’s previous experience as competitive driver is equal to 0 years; 
LM(dr) – leader’s previous experience as competitive driver is equal to 1 to 5 years; 
LL(dr) – leader’s previous experience as competitive driver is greater than 5 years; 
DN – driver’s previous experience as competitive driver in Formula 1 is equal to 0 years; 
DM – driver’s previous experience as competitive driver in Formula 1 is equal to 1 to 5 years; 
DL– driver’s previous experience as competitive driver in Formula 1 is greater than 5 years 
Significance: † - significant at 0.10 level; * - significant at 0.05 level; ** - significant at 0.01 level; *** - significant 
at 0.001 level
  
Appendix 1 
Summary of F1 performance: Twelve most successful teams 1950 – 2006* 
 
*Table reproduced from Jenkins, 2010, p 901. 
  
Team 
Period of winning  
Grand Prix 
Number of Grand 
Prix wins 
Number of win 
periods  
Ferrari 1951 - 2006 186 7 
McLaren 1968 - 2006 148 5 
Williams 1979 - 2004 112 5 
Lotus 1960 - 1987 79 4 
Brabham 1964 - 1985 35 3 
Renault (2 entries) 
1979 - 1983;  
2003 - 2006 
33 3 
Benetton 1986 - 1997 28 3 
Tyrrell 1971 - 1983 23 2 
BRM 1962 - 1972 17 3 
Cooper 1958 - 1967 16 3 
Alfa Romeo 1950 - 1951 10 1 
Matra 1968 - 1969 10 1 
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Appendix 2 
 
 
Table 8 
Clustered OLS regression results where the dependent  
variable is whether a car gains a podium position  
 
[Estimated for 2 years only where budget data are available:  
2006 and 2008] (clustered by year) 
 
Explanatory 
variable 
Model 1 
coefficient 
(robust 
standard 
error) 
  
DRIVER or 
MECHANIC 
0.0987* 
(0.0075) 
# CARS included 
0.0081* 
(0.0003) 
TEAM BUDGETS 
0.0016** 
(0.000003) 
Constant 
-0.3782* 
(0.0091) 
  
R
2 
0.0728 
N (Observations) 764 
N (Clusters = Years) 2 
* - significant at 0.05 level;  
** - significant at 0.01 level 
Notes: We have obtained estimates of budgets for the years of 2006 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Formula_One) and 
2008 (http://www.f1fanatic.co.uk/2008/09/22/toyota-has-biggest-f1-budget-4456m/) and conducted OLS clustered 
OLS regression where we excluded individual leader and team effects but included obtained budget information. 
This budget information is not official figures (which are a part of each team’s commercial secret and therefore are 
not obtainable) but expert estimates. Our results (presented above) show that even when the team effects are not 
included, having former driver or mechanic as the head of the team influences team performance more than the team 
budget. Particularly, while former driver or mechanic leader (rather than former manager or engineer) increases the 
propensity of team winning a podium position by 9.87%, higher budget increases the chances of winning a podium 
by only 0.16%. This suggests that our results remain stable even when we include budget estimates in our 
regressions. 
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Appendix 3 
Methodological information about studies cited by Mumford et al. (2002) 
Study Sample Team size # Leaders Industry/ 
Org. 
Longi-
tudinal or 
one-shot 
Method Main research 
question 
Andrews and 
Farris (1967) 
94 scientists 
forming 21 
small teams 
2 to 12 
(including 
leader) 
1 per team NASA 
research 
centre 
(scientists) 
One-shot Questionnaire 
conducted among 
non-leader team 
members and the 
answers averaged 
across all teams 
How do leaders’ 
technical skills 
influence 
innovation in 
teams 
Barnowe 
(1975) 
81 teams, 
859 scientists  
On average, 
11 scientists 
1 per project 
(group may 
work on 
several 
projects so 
there could 
be several 
leaders in 
the group 
“A large  
research 
organization 
engaged in a 
mixture of 
basic and 
applied 
research  
throughout 
the United 
States” 
One-shot Questionnaires 
with scientists 
(leaders and non-
leaders) and 
interviews 
(interviews were 
conducted with 39 
administrators –so 
“project leaders” 
in this paper are 
not actually heads 
of organization 
and have bosses) 
How do leaders’ 
technical skills 
influence 
innovation in 
teams? 
Tierney 
(1999) 
191 non-
clerical 
employees 
(research 
managers, 
research 
scientists, 
section 
leaders, 
project 
leaders, work 
group 
professional 
and work 
group 
technicians) 
 
2-13 
(including 
leaders) 
8 levels of 
leaders 
R&D sector 
of large 
chemical 
corporation 
One-shot Survey How do technical 
skills affect 
creativity? 
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Paper Sample Team size # leaders Industry/ 
Org. 
Longi-
tudinal or 
one-shot 
Method Main research 
question 
Farris (1969) 151 
engineers 
not specified not specified 
(looks at 
people in 
process of 
“movement 
into 
leadership 
positions” 
rather than 
existing 
leaders) 
Science/ 
Enginee-ring 
Longitudi-
nal but only 
2 points in 
time (6 years 
difference)  
“4 measures of 
performance were 
correlated with 6 
organizational 
factors: 
involvement in 
work, influence on 
work goals, 
colleague contact, 
diversity of work 
activities, salary, 
and number of 
subordinates” 
How is 
performance 
affected by 
involvement in 
work, influence on 
work goals, 
colleague contact, 
diversity of work 
activities, salary, 
and number of 
subordinates? 
Thamhain 
and Gemmill  
(1974) 
22 project 
managers 
and 66 
project 
employees 
not specified 1 leader/ 
manager per 
project 
Project-
oriented 
business 
division of 
large 
electronic 
company 
One-shot Survey How can leaders 
influence workers 
through expertise 
rather than 
authority? 
Basadur, 
Runco, and 
Vega (2000) 
112 
managers 
(mid-level) 
not specified not specified Large 
international 
consumer 
goods 
manufacture
r 
One shot Field experiment How leaders’ 
technical ability 
affect team 
creativity? 
Farris (1972) 117 
professional 
scientists 
(including 14 
supervisors) 
2-17 team 
members 
1 per team NASA 
scientists 
(chemists 
and 
physicists) 
One-shot Survey How do leaders 
participate in 
teams’ 
innovations? 
Jung (2001) 53 teams of 
3-4 
undergraduat
e students 
 
 
3-4 team 
members 
1 per team University 
students 
One-shot Laboratory 
experiment 
How does 
technical ability 
affect creativity? 
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Paper Sample Team size # leaders Industry/ 
Org. 
Longi-
tudinal or 
one-shot 
Method Main research 
question 
Sosik, Kahai 
& Avolio 
(1998) 
159 
undergraduat
e students, 36 
teams 
21 teams 4 
people each 
+15 teams 5 
people each 
1 per team 
(leaders 
were 
confederates 
– not part of 
the 
experimental 
subject pool) 
University 
students 
One-shot Laboratory 
experiment 
How does 
technical ability 
affect creativity? 
Sosik, Kahai 
& Avolio 
(1999) 
159 
undergraduat
e students, 36 
teams 
21 teams 4 
people each 
+15 teams 5 
people each 
1 per team 
(leaders 
were 
confederates 
– not part of 
the 
experimental 
subject pool) 
University 
students 
One-shot Laboratory 
experiment 
How does 
technical ability 
affect creativity? 
Mossholder
&Dewhurst 
(1980) 
271 scientists 
and 
engineers 
(non-leaders) 
not specified not specified Large 
multidiscipli
nary nuclear 
R&D centre 
One shot Survey What is the 
relationship 
between 
leadership and 
creativity? 
House 
(1971) 
 
Study 1 and 
2 
199 office 
employees 
not specified not specified Heavy 
equipment 
manufacturi
ng company 
One-shot Survey How does 
technical ability 
affect innovation? 
House 
(1971) 
Study 3 
122 
employees 
including 13 
managers 
not specified not specified Chemical 
manufacturi
ng plant 
One-shot Survey How does 
technical ability 
affect innovation? 
Goodall and 
Pogrebna 
(2014) 
Non-
experimental 
data from the 
field 
Large teams 
of 600-700 
people on 
average, 
sometimes 
more 
141 leaders F1 
competition 
Longitudi-
nal annual 
data from 
1950 to 2011 
Econometric 
analysis of non-
experimental data 
What is the 
relationship 
between expert 
leadership and 
team 
performance? 
 
